RuAviation

The escalating US export restrictions targeting China’s aviation industry have significantly intensified the technological rivalry between the two global powers. Since the initiation of the trade war during President Donald Trump’s first term, the US has progressively tightened export controls on the supply of critical technologies to Beijing. Initially focused on semiconductors and rare earth metals, these measures have expanded to encompass vital components and technologies for the aerospace sector.

In late May 2025, the US Department of Commerce suspended export licenses allowing American companies to supply aircraft engines and related technologies to the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC). The restrictions cover Electronic Computer-Aided Design (ECAD) software, chemicals for semiconductor manufacturing, butane and ethane, machine tools, and aerospace equipment. Affected ECAD manufacturers include Cadence, Synopsys, and Siemens EDA, as well as engine supplier GE Aerospace, and key avionics component suppliers Honeywell and Collins Aerospace. According to Reuters, this suspension threatens to disrupt the production and development of COMAC’s flagship models—the C919, C909, and the prospective C929 wide-body airliner—all of which heavily rely on US technology.

With the arrival of a new Republican administration in the White House in 2025, US export controls were broadened. The list of restrictions expanded to include not only the LEAP-1C engines for the C919, but also GE Aerospace CF34-10A engines, which power the C909 regional jet. Both engine types incorporate US-origin technology, making stringent export licensing inevitable. The suspension of export licenses means that COMAC will face a substantial challenge once existing engine inventories in China are depleted, directly impacting production rates and aircraft delivery schedules.

The LEAP-1C engine, manufactured by CFM International—a 50/50 joint venture between GE Aerospace and Safran of France—is the exclusive powerplant for the C919. The CF34-10A engine, also produced by GE Aerospace, is the primary engine for the C909. These engines are critical for COMAC’s ability to compete with established aircraft manufacturers such as Boeing, Airbus, and Embraer.

An attempt was made to circumvent US export control restrictions on aircraft engine supplies to China by importing LEAP-1C engines via Airbus, designating them as European products. However, this strategy encountered complex regulatory and logistical obstacles. Concurrently, China is pursuing the development of an indigenous engine, the CJ-1000A, but the timeframe for its commercial entry into service on the C919 remains uncertain.

The CJ-1000A turbofan engine, developed by the Aero Engine Corporation of China (AECC), produces a thrust of 12,500-13,000 kgf (approximately 27,500-28,700 lbf or 120-130 kN) and exhibits a specific fuel consumption (SFC) in the range of 0.55-0.6 kg/kN·h, which is comparable to modern Western engines. For reference, the LEAP-1C demonstrates an SFC of around 0.53 kg/kN·h. Official data on the CJ-1000A’s SFC is scarce, but Chinese sources suggest values of approximately 0.52-0.58 kg/(kN·h). The CJ-1000A features a high bypass ratio and incorporates composite materials in its design to enhance fuel efficiency. However, the ultimate success of the CJ-1000A will depend on its reliability, service life, and compliance with ICAO environmental standards. Numerous ground tests and subsystem validations have been completed. Flight testing on a flying testbed is currently underway, and certification is projected for the late 2020s.

Alongside engines, the US has imposed export restrictions on avionics and critical aircraft systems, including navigation equipment, Auxiliary Power Units (APUs), flight control systems, and cabin equipment—all of which are essential for aircraft certification and safe operation. For instance, Honeywell Aerospace supplies the 131-9A APU, which provides electrical power and air pressure during engine start and ground operations. Honeywell also provides GPS/Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) and an integrated flight management system. Collins Aerospace provides the C919 with integrated “glass cockpits,” including electronic displays, VHF/UHF radios, flight computers, emergency systems, and cabin management systems.

The suspension of export licenses for these systems disrupts COMAC’s supply chain, complicating the production and certification of Chinese aircraft to international standards. Without access to Honeywell and Collins Aerospace avionics, COMAC faces the prospect of being unable to obtain international airworthiness validation for the C919, a prerequisite for aircraft sales in the global market.

Transitioning to alternative avionics systems requires navigating complex certification procedures. COMAC must demonstrate that the new systems meet all safety and reliability requirements established by regulatory agencies, particularly the FAA in the US or EASA in Europe. This process involves extensive testing, simulations of various flight scenarios, and demonstration of compliance with regulatory requirements. The cost and time required for certification can vary significantly depending on the complexity of the system and the requirements of the regulatory authorities. Additionally, COMAC would also have to develop and build flight simulators for pilot training and ground-based hardware-in-the-loop (HITL) integration stands, often referred to as “iron birds,” to refine the new avionics and software.

The combined US restrictions on engines, aircraft systems, and avionics strike at China’s ambitious strategic goal of creating a globally competitive range of commercial aircraft. The COMAC C919 and C909 programs are intended not only to replace Western aircraft within China but also to exert influence in the geopolitical sphere. Industry analysts estimate that direct financial losses for COMAC due to these export restrictions could reach several billion US dollars over the next 3-5 years. These losses stem from slower production rates, increased costs associated with finding alternative sources, and delays in certification processes.

The Chinese government, with tens of billions of dollars invested in COMAC and the aerospace sector, faces the risk of non-return of its investments and unrealized strategic ambitions. Notably, according to a study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, export restrictions inflict significant economic damage on both Chinese companies and American suppliers, who collectively lose billions of dollars in capitalization. This indirectly affects the Chinese side as well, slowing down industry development and increasing the costs of import substitution. The restrictions also indirectly impact the Chinese economy as a whole, where the aerospace sector is a key driver of technological innovation, employment, and export revenue. Furthermore, the need to accelerate the development of domestic technologies and import substitution increases timeframes and costs, placing additional pressure on government budgets and industrial planning.

US export restrictions could also have a significant impact on the development program for the C929 wide-body aircraft. Initially, it was assumed that the C929 would be equipped with Western-made engines (Rolls-Royce Trent 1000 or GE Aviation GEnx). However, in light of current restrictions, the use of the Russian PD-35 engine, which is being developed by enterprises of the United Engine Corporation (UEC) in Perm, is becoming more likely.

Moreover, restrictions on the supply of Western avionics may force COMAC to develop its own or use alternative aircraft systems and avionics, including those from European and Russian companies. For example, Thales Group (France) is a leading supplier of avionics and aircraft communication systems. Thales offers comprehensive equipment that can replace American analogues.

Lufthansa Technik (Germany) is a major provider of maintenance, repair, and component supply services for civil aviation. The company has experience working with a wide range of units and components, including landing gear control systems, engine components, and avionics.

Premium AEROTEC (Germany/Romania) is one of Europe’s leading manufacturers of aerospace structures and products made of aluminum, titanium, and composite materials. The company is a partner of Airbus and can supply large-scale components for COMAC aircraft fuselages.

FACC (Austria) is a COMAC supplier that produces key components for the C909 and C919, including cabin interiors, cockpit panels, spoilers, and winglets. The company has significant experience in the design, manufacture, and certification of aircraft components.

Aerocomposit (Ulyanovsk, Russia) developed the composite wing and manufacturing technologies for large first-level structures for the MC-21 medium-range airliner. It uses Russian polymer composite materials and Russian equipment for laying dry carbon fiber. It produces the MC-21 wing and center wing box from PCM (Polymer Composite Materials) using vacuum infusion technology. Its branch in Kazan manufactures composite wing mechanization and empennage elements using autoclave molding technology.

ONPP Tekhnologiya (Obninsk, Russia) mass-produces carbon fiber reinforced plastic load-bearing elements of the MC-21 empennage. Automated processes and technologies of its own design, as well as domestic materials, are widely used in the production of integrated stringer structures.

Enterprises of the Radio-Electronic Technologies Concern (KRET) produce all avionics for the Il-114-300, SJ-100, and MC-21 aircraft, including control, radio communication, and navigation systems. Software for the integrated control system of Russian aircraft is developed by the Moscow Institute of Electronics and Automation (MIEA).

Thus, US export restrictions not only slow down the development of current COMAC programs but also inflict serious damage on American companies participating in cooperation on the C909, C919, and C929 aircraft. The transition of the Chinese aviation industry to alternative suppliers entails significant technical adaptation, recertification, and integration efforts, which may further delay the production timelines of existing and prospective COMAC projects.

Sources:

• Reuters — Article on the ban on the sale of US software for designing microcircuits to China:
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-tells-us-chip-designers-stop-selling-china-ft-reports-2025-05-28/
• FlightGlobal — Analysis of COMAC’s problems with the supply of American engines and avionics:
https://www.flightglobal.com/air-transport/sledgehammer-sanctions-on-comac-will-harm-us-more-think-tank/141545.article
• Aviation Week & Space Technology — Overview of the impact of export restrictions on COMAC programs:
https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/aircraft-propulsion/us-suspends-some-aerospace-technology-exports-china
• The Air Current — Analysis on the impact of export restrictions on COMAC (2025):
https://theaircurrent.com/analysis/us-export-controls-impact-comac-2025/
• Official website of Thales Group — Information about avionics and communication systems:
https://www.thalesgroup.com/fr/monde/aeronautique/press_release/thales-finalise-lacquisition-cobham-aerospace-communications-et
• Simple Flying — Five major Western suppliers of COMAC C919:
https://simpleflying.com/comac-c919-western-suppliers-list/
• The New York Times — USA suspends export of aviation and semiconductor equipment to China:
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/28/business/economy/jet-engine-chip-software-exports-to-china.html
• The New York Times — Trump is targeting the plane that China considers a symbol of ‘power’:
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/30/business/china-comac-c919-trump.html

Artem Kirillov
for Aviation of Russia website