At the Airshow China 2024 international aerospace show held in Zhuhai, China, on 12-15 November, Russia presented abroad for the first time the Su-57 fifth-generation aircraft and the 177C fifth-generation engine for front-line aviation. Also during the Airshow, Rosoboronexport signed its first contract with a foreign customer for the delivery of Su-57 fighters.
These events became landmarks for the world military aviation and were closely followed both in China itself and in the USA, the countries of South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean basin, including India, which, despite its common membership in the SCO and BRICS with China, has certain tensions with its neighbour. India could receive a high-tech fifth-generation combat aircraft for its air force as early as 2019/2020, but so far New Delhi does not have such a vehicle, and the prospects for its arrival are vague. These circumstances give reason to talk about the failed Russian-Indian project of the FGFA fifth-generation multi-role fighter aircraft (MFI).
In 2005, in order to attract additional funds needed to intensify work on the programme of advanced front-line aviation complexes (PAK FA, T-50, Su-57), Sukhoi management considered the possibility of involving potential foreign partners in the project. India was considered one of the most likely partners.
In late November of the same year, the country’s Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee, who was in Moscow on an official visit, stated that India was not going to participate in the development of the project and finance the development of the MFI, as India would like to participate in all stages of the development of the fifth-generation fighter, from conceptualisation, design and research to joint production, and India is not interested in simply exporting the finished machine. Besides, the Indian Air Force needed a lighter and single-engine aircraft.
Back in the early 2000s, India started negotiations with the Pentagon for possible F-22 deliveries. But the US had never planned to sell its advanced fighter jet by the standards of 25 years ago to anyone, including Delhi. What they were ready to do was to offer the F-35, and although the F-35 option partially suited the Indian military, the negotiations did not go any further.
As a result, the Indian defence establishment was faced with the fact that no one would sell them a ready-made fighter, while Russian designers had already created the T-50 project. Remembering the old proposal for joint work, the Indian side offered to cooperate on the development of the fifth-generation fighter.
In the end, the Indians recognised that Sukhoi’s approaches to the PAK FA fully meet the world’s requirements for the next generation of advanced combat systems. The joint programme was named FGFA, Fifth Generation Fight Aircraft. In autumn 2007, an agreement on joint work was signed. According to the document, the Indian side participated in the project only financially, while all design work and construction of finished aircraft were assigned to Russia.
In 2008, during Vladimir Putin’s visit to Delhi, the final contours of co-operation between the two countries on the MFI project were defined. It was decided that the airframe, engines and other aircraft equipment would be developed by Sukhoi. Electronics, such as avionics, control systems and navigation equipment, will be developed by India’s HAL.
In December 2010, during the visit of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Delhi, Sukhoi Design Bureau, Rosoboronexport and HAL signed a preliminary contract for the development of the FGFA on the T-50 platform. The value of the contract with the construction of 250 aircraft for the Indian Air Force was estimated at $35 billion. Their delivery was to begin in 2020. It was also envisaged that the FGFA could be sold to friendly countries.
In accordance with the agreements, the aircraft was to have a greater degree of unification with the PAK FA, this approach reduced the cost of development and production of aircraft. In total, the development was estimated at $8-9bn. In January 2016, it was agreed that the parties would each invest $4 billion over the next seven years.
At the end of May 2016, Indian media reported that the countries were close to signing an agreement for the next stage of developmental work (D&D). But before that, the Indian Air Force intends to make more than 30 changes to the existing design of the FGFA prototype. It was about avionics, manoeuvrability and stealth. The first flight of the new vehicle was scheduled for 2017, and the FGFA was to go to the troops in 2019.
However, no agreement was signed in 2016, 2017 or 2018 to continue the ROC. Moreover, reports began to emerge that the joint work might be stopped altogether at the initiative of the Indian side. Russian representatives tried their best to suppress such information, trying to keep India in the project, saying that the terms of the new contract had been fully agreed, the cost and the volume of technologies to be transferred to the Indian side had been negotiated. But it was clear that the Indian military put forward conditions that are unacceptable to Russia, so the project is stalled and, most likely, will not be implemented.
In March 2017, these assumptions were confirmed by Konstantin Sivkov, president of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems. He opined that Russia may transfer the technologies for the production of the FGFA to India, but not in full, they should be modified for the export version of the aircraft.
The Indian defence ministry thought otherwise and cited as an example the contract with Russia for the supply of Su-30MKI fighters, which did not provide for technology transfer, which the Indian government considered a serious omission.
The issue of full technology transfer for the fifth-generation aircraft eventually became a key issue for the viability of the project. But the Indian side, unwilling to admit its responsibility for the failure of joint development, tried to remain ‘white and fluffy’ and began to declare that the PAK FA did not meet the requirements for a fifth-generation fighter.
The Indian Air Force expressed its dissatisfaction with the aircraft by saying that the T-50 does not have a proper low radar cross-section (RCS) and its engine does not have sufficient power. These and 43 other criticisms and shortcomings were presented to Russia in the spring of 2016, in 2017 they became public knowledge, primarily Indian.
Delhi also accused Russia of offering India the FGFA aircraft, which will be very different from the PAK FA. Moreover, despite Russian pressure for a final R&D contract for the FGFA, India now wants to know if it will get an approximate price tag of $25 billion for 127 of these single-seat aircraft. It is impossible to say anything definite on the price as the details of the arrangements are not known, what is included in this $25 billion (and earlier $35 billion) is also unknown, but the desire to get the contract price reduced through blackmail is obvious.
On 13 July 2018, the head of the Indian Defence Ministry Nirmala Sitharaman commented on the department’s decision on the FGFA programme, which boils down to the following: you develop the aircraft, spend your money on it, and then, someday we will think about it. ‘We have conveyed to Russia that India is not part of this project now, but we have also told the Russians that they can go ahead with it on their own and we can join the programme at a later stage,’ the minister said.
Of course, this stance of the Indian Defence Ministry could not suit the UAC. Funding of the project by both sides was stopped, prototyping deadlines were not met, and in more than 10 years of joint work, the matter has not progressed beyond preliminary design. Due to various internal reasons and the existing lobby among the Indian military, which is oriented towards interaction with the US, New Delhi has not shown interest in further work on the FGFA project. It was reported that India would develop the AMCA fifth generation fighter on its own, without any help from anyone else.
Later, Indian Air Force Chief of Staff Birender Singh Dhanoa confirmed the Air Force’s interest in acquiring T-50 fighters from Russia. He said that the country would be more willing to acquire these aircraft after seeing them in service with the Russian Air Force.
Six years have passed and the year 2024 is coming to an end. The Su-57 has been demonstrated in China and some 27 fighters have already been handed over to the Russian Air and Space Forces. The aircraft perform combat missions in the special military operation zone, remaining undetectable by NATO air defence systems. Su-57 pilots are also carrying out their missions directly over Ukraine behind the front line.
A demonstration in Zhuhai of a new engine for operational-tactical aviation suggests that the second-stage engine for the Su-57 is ready. And even if the 177C is destined for another aircraft or UAV, ‘izdelie 30’ will soon replace the AL-41F1 engine. Thus, the aircraft will receive the final component that a fifth-generation fighter should possess.
As for the accusations against the Su-57 regarding the use of stealth technologies, we will talk more about this in subsequent publications, here we will cite two facts. First: the RCS characteristics are secret. As for the PAK FA/T-50/Su-57, they have never been officially disclosed, and all the values that are circulating among bloggers and in social networks are empirical. They can be accurately named by the US military who work in Ukraine, but they are silent. Apparently they don’t know the true values either. They were also surprised by the appearance of Su-57s in the skies of Syria, which they (and we too) learnt about from amateur videos shot on a smartphone.
Second. The Su-57 prototypes (T-50-4 and T-50-7) that were presented in Zhuhai and the production aircraft are very different. Including the fit of the skin panels, riveting or the use of bolted joints. This has already been pointed out on the web.
What’s the bottom line? There is no denying the fact that India needed advanced combat aircraft the day before yesterday, given that China is making enviable progress in this regard. The claims that India made to Russia on the FGFA are partly eliminated, partly simply far-fetched.
It is most likely that the resumption of work on the aircraft is not far off, but now the project will be implemented in a different way: organisation of serial production of an adapted export version of the Su-57E on its territory in accordance with the government’s Make in India initiative and based on the experience of such production of Su-30MKI fighters. Or HAL will have to do its best to prove that home-grown designers are as good as Chinese or Russian ones and take its fifth-generation AMCA fighter to the skies as planned in 2032.