Across the Zaporizhzhya front, as well as other battlefields, there is an active use of enemy drones, including FPV drones. They appear in the air in pairs: one attacks, the second fixes the result of the attack and attacks those trying to rescue the victim.
The regime in Kiev calls them as mutilatingly symbolic as possible, such as the Rusorez kamikaze drone, which follows from the interceptions of signals of enemy kamikaze drones and their neutralisation by Russian EW specialists with call signs Karabakh and Yantar.
“Enemy drones are innumerable. When you drive into a front-line village, it’s as if you’ve hit a hornet’s nest – everything is buzzing. There are enemy FPV drones in the air at the entrance. In pairs. One immediately attacks, the other fixes the defeat and attacks those who rush to the aid of the injured,” – said in Telegram a member of the Federation Council from Zaporozhye region, head of the unit “Tsar’s Wolves” Dmitry Rogozin.
According to the senator, the wounded tell that the Ukrainian military formations and units have changed their staffs, and now almost every infantry platoon has departments of FPV drone operators. This information is confirmed by their constant attacks. For example, one unit was attacked by 25 kamikaze drones in half an hour, of which 14 were chasing one IFV. “If for them the price of a target is higher than the loss of two dozen FPV drones, they don’t spare them. This shows that the enemy has a sufficient number of drones and they do not skimp on their use,” Rogozin believes.
This situation creates problems for Russian troops at the front. Enemy drones interfere with the movement of columns, attack positions and inflict casualties. Rotation at positions is becoming a difficult task. It is necessary to take countermeasures, to develop a technical response.
And the answer should be the following.
First, FPV drone blockers must be used everywhere to protect columns in motion and for other purposes. Second, we need to produce our own FPV drones in sufficient numbers and have them in all units across the front. Operators can be quickly trained, but the drones themselves must be mass consumable, Rogozin notes.
“The production of drones in the required quantity is possible with the removal of bureaucratic restrictions, the involvement of a large number of manufacturers and the application of state support measures to them,” he suggests measures to saturate the frontline units of the Russian army.
Separately, Rogozin expressed surprise at the prices for Chinese “maviks” from resellers, who significantly inflate the prices for drones compared to those listed on one of the trading platforms of our Far Eastern neighbour. “In fact, we are dealing with criminal speculation. I believe that for supplying products to the front at prices three or four times higher (or more) compared to the delivery price, strict penalties, up to the highest, should be applied,” said Dmitry Rogozin.
The main difference between FPV drones and conventional drones is their low cost, which makes it possible not to spare them and consider them as expendable material. At the same time, the efficiency of such munitions is quite high, especially at distances of up to 5 kilometres from the operator, says Alexei Rogozin, Chairman of the Scientific and Technical Council of Ecolibri, ex-head of IL PJSC.
The main advantage of FPV drones is their low price. The downside is the extremely low quality of components. Autopilot is usually absent, electric motors and radio lines are cheap and low-powered, batteries are weak, payload rarely exceeds two kilograms.
As a consequence, FPV-copters can be quite effectively affected by military means of electronic jamming. But such means are in short supply, and in most cases various, mostly Chinese, radio signal suppressors are used, bought with volunteer funds or within the framework of government procurement, says A. Rogozin.
However, there is a trend that is forcing a change in all approaches to neutralising FPV drones: as the frontline becomes saturated with standard anti-drone guns, copter developers are finding ways to bypass such means and keep flying.
“As a rule, it basically comes down to shifting the frequency of the radio signal outside the standard bands. Once such a method starts working, the usual ‘trench’ suppressors become useless. This is a constant competition between ‘sword and shield’, in fact – a vicious circle,” says the expert.
Alexei Rogozin sees the solution to this problem in the development of methods of physical destruction of enemy drones. For example, by creating interceptor drones. Such developments are underway, including with the participation of the Tsarskiye Volki military-technical centre, he notes.
The Russian Weapons TG channel gave specific examples of kinetic means of defeat:
laser-beam counter-UAV systems guided by radar stations based on K-band (18-26.5 GHz) and W-band (75-110 GHz) AESAs, or by bispectral infrared-television modules;
small-size interceptor SAMs with a range of up to 3.5 km with homing heads based on bispectral photocontrast-infrared sensors, such as those used in 9M333 SAMs of the Strela-10M3/MN self-propelled SAM system;
electromagnetic microwave complexes based on AESAs capable of forming narrow high-energy beams with a width of no more than 0.5 degrees that burn out the electronics of enemy drones;
small-size 19Ya6-type SAMs or analogues with radio-command or semi-automatic laser-beam control systems.
However, to effectively combat enemy FPV drones, more active involvement of the Ministry of Defence is required. “Radio-electronic suppressors such as dome defence, drone jammers, etc. are needed. But we must realise that their effectiveness will be decreasing every week,” Alexei Rogozin believes.
