RuAviation

On April 17, a tg channel posted a video in which soldiers from the country’s Army Combat Reserve (BARS) Kaskad identified and then destroyed a Ukrainian military boat on the Dnieper River near the Kakhovka Reservoir with a Lancet barraging munition.

Attentive viewers should have noticed in this video that visually the explosion when hitting the target is different from what we saw earlier on numerous footage of the destruction of artillery, MLRS and armored vehicles of Ukrainian armed formations (UAF). Its power in this video is noticeably greater. And this could indicate that ZALA aero has increased the mass of the warhead of the barrage munition.

Experts from the “Military Chronicle” commented on how the defeat of the Ukrainian boat on the Dnieper is related to the offensive of the UAF, which is widely announced and expected before the end of spring, and drew several important conclusions from this.

“First, judging by the volume of the blast and the nature of the target hit, the Lancet warhead was enlarged. And although the Ukrainian boat did not sink, hitting the deckhouse and burning it out together with part of the lower rooms would lead to the ship being scrapped,” the Military Chronicle believes.

A more powerful Lancet warhead will increase the chances of hitting SAU and tanks when the UAF offensive begins. In this case the vehicles may not be completely destroyed, damage and disabling will be enough, which in the conditions of the offensive will be equal to their loss.

The second conclusion the experts draw is that the gunboat was detected as it was leaving a camouflaged floating vessel. “And although the vessel was destroyed when it entered the Kakhovka reservoir, in theory nothing prevents the massive use of Lancets at the location of the boats both independently and before or after the work of artillery or aircraft of operational-tactical aviation with FAB-120/250 bombs with planning and correction modules,” the commentary notes. Such a scenario could be implemented if the UAF tries to land another landing near Energodar, and the enemy has such plans.

The use of the Lancet kamikaze drone at a considerable distance from the front line indicates that the frontline is being monitored. And even the smallest UAF activity is recorded and promptly covered either by artillery and aviation or, as with the boat, by barrage ammunition operators. While the Lancet’s range allows it to strike within tactical defense depths of 15-30 kilometers, surveillance is probably established over most important military installations of the UAF at distances of up to 80 kilometers.

Why have these facilities not yet been destroyed?

It is quite possible that some of the enemy’s uncovered and scouted targets are not being deliberately touched by the RF Armed Forces at the moment. In this sense, the military is well served by the experience of destroying enemy supplies in Artemivsk and Zaporizhzhia, where the UAF specifically allows some resources to be accumulated to support the garrison, and then destroys hangars with equipment and military personnel in one air strike, without spending ammunition on each target individually.

In addition, some of the UAF facilities that are reached by the Lancets (and hence at least the rocket artillery) are most likely under constant surveillance and serve as an indicator of the offensive. If atypical activity begins there, it means the UAF is preparing to attack.

Such facilities will most likely be destroyed at the very last moment, just before the offensive, when the enemy will concentrate the maximum number of people and equipment there. Time will tell how the UAF will adapt to such conditions and whether it will be able to do so.

The problem is that the large forces (for example, a full brigade of 6000 men with equipment and tanks) under such level of control from the air and the current conditions of lack of trucks and normal roads cannot be secretly transferred to any of the areas. This suggests that the enemy will most likely transfer the main reserves for the offensive just before the start of the offensive, most likely several days in advance.