RuAviation

On September 11, 2025, the U.S. Federal Government removed Belarusian national carrier Belavia from the SDN (Specially Designated Nationals) list while simultaneously prohibiting the airline from operating Boeing aircraft to Russia and several other countries. Instead of complete isolation, the carrier now faces bureaucratic hurdles, formal approvals, and persistent risks of rule tightening. The shift marks a transformation in pressure tactics: official permits no longer guarantee full market access or technical support, forcing the industry to adapt to new, less obvious forms of external restrictions.

President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus criticized the current situation in public remarks, directly pointing to what he termed “absurd restrictions” and the persistence of “residual effects” from previous prohibitions that prevent a return to pre-2021 status quo.

“They announced sanctions removal from Belavia, yet some residual effects remain. Both Cherginets [the airline’s CEO] and our Belavia leadership state that lifting these sanctions doesn’t fully release us from certain absurd restrictions. We can’t always operate, maintain, or purchase everywhere. The Americans acknowledge this. They say it takes time to eliminate these residual effects,” Lukashenko explained on October 14 during a meeting on global international developments and Belarus-U.S. relations.

Lukashenko’s political statements align with operational realities. Formal requests for spare parts procurement and Boeing aircraft technical support undergo additional bureaucratic clearance procedures. According to the president, the real impact of sanctions relief can only be assessed long-term—a view supported by data on protracted approvals from American lessors and the insurance industry.

Aviation expert Oleg Evdokimov, president of MelonAero consulting firm, argues that Belarus should focus less on circumventing restrictions and more on building partnerships with foreign governments and companies that serve Belarusian interests.

“The president is absolutely right calling residual restrictions ‘absurd obligations.’ These aren’t merely bureaucratic remnants but systemic traps embedded in the sanctions pressure architecture. Formal SDN removal doesn’t restore sovereign control over fleet, routes, and service infrastructure. The priority isn’t circumventing restrictions but building a sustainable interaction model where decisions are made in Minsk, not Washington or Brussels. One tool for such a model could be a neutral leasing platform with international jurisdiction, operating outside the direct sanctions field,” Evdokimov told Aviation Russia.

As of October 2025, Belavia can perform Boeing aircraft maintenance and scheduled work only under limited schemes. Such permissions apply exclusively to flights to countries outside the Eurasian Economic Union, while operations to Russia, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria require separate licenses. This is explicitly stated in guidance from U.S. regulators sent to airline management.

Expert aviation market reviews in various media outlets confirm sanctions-related complications. Lessors cite residual risks when providing new aircraft to the Belarusian carrier. Legislative and insurance formalities for new deals with Belarusian companies have become more complex, and some Western entities avoid long-term cooperation altogether, fearing potential sanctions tightening and export control issues.

The carrier’s fleet currently comprises approximately 14 aircraft with an average age of around 11 years, though two B737s date from 1993 and 1997. The operator also maintains three Airbus A330-200 widebodies registered as EW-587PD, EW-588PD, and EW-589PD. Aircraft EW-587PD has operated long-haul flights in Belavia’s route network since June 2025. EW-588PD completed its first post-restoration flight in October and will enter service shortly. EW-589PD remains non-operational.

Building a sustainable fleet structure has become a key operational priority for Belavia under current conditions. Given B737 usage restrictions, the company may focus on acquiring European-manufactured aircraft—specifically A320/321neo models. Narrowbody fleet diversification appears promising, as the global market currently shows a surplus of relatively new aircraft of this type rendered idle due to PW1000G engine family issues. Such aircraft are available in Russia (S7 Airlines), the United States (Spirit), and other countries including Southeast Asia, India, and Europe.

Evdokimov believes replacing Boeing with Airbus could serve as a tool for balancing external pressure. From an economic standpoint, A320/321neo operations offer clear advantages over older Boeing models through superior fuel efficiency, potentially reducing the company’s operational costs. “Leasing and integrating a new aircraft type requires comprehensive verification of ownership chain legal transparency. For Belavia, minimizing secondary sanctions risks is paramount, necessitating transaction audits involving international expert structures. Such operations remain viable only with sufficient guarantees from both sellers and regulators,” Evdokimov noted.

From a technological perspective, integrating Airbus aircraft into the company’s existing infrastructure should pose no major challenges. Belavia already has experience retraining crews on the new-to-carrier A330 type. Flight and engineering crew preparation, along with equipping necessary service bases, would take approximately five to six months. Significant additional costs can be avoided with proper planning, though the final fleet renewal decision depends on Belavia management’s readiness, deal economics, and regulatory authority requirements.

Potential deals with foreign lessors will be considered at levels higher than Belavia management, accounting for political and economic risks still associated with potential service access limitations and Russia flight bans. The European Commission, following the U.S. government’s example, may impose additional sanctions against Belavia if it finds new leverage over the carrier’s operations. Therefore, leasing deals involving U.S. and EU companies may proceed under new models with enhanced legal scrutiny.

However, expanding Belavia’s fleet with A320/321neo family aircraft may prove impractical due to Pratt & Whitney engine issues. As of 2025, the global aviation market faces massive spare parts shortages, maintenance delays, and reduced durability and reliability of these powerplants. This causes prolonged groundings not only for Russian operators but carriers worldwide. For instance, S7 Airlines faces sanctions restrictions resulting in substantial PW-powered aircraft groundings with virtually no repair and return-to-service prospects.

For Belavia, despite the September 11 decisions, the situation is complicated by limited access to Pratt & Whitney’s international service network, certified material shortages, and substantial scheduled maintenance delays. These factors increase operational risks, complicate operations, and may negatively impact financial performance due to forced groundings of new aircraft.

Under these conditions, alternatives include acquiring aircraft with other manufacturers’ engines—for example, Airbus family aircraft powered by CFM International LEAP engines—or returning to more proven Boeing models with support access through secondary markets or local suppliers. Another option is Russian MC-21-310 aircraft, though these jets are undergoing certification expected to conclude by fall 2026.

The company shows interest in Russian aircraft given Russia’s plans to expand domestic aerospace manufacturing and launch serial production of new types by 2030. This doesn’t represent forced rejection of Western jets but reflects an objective desire to expand the lineup with modern Russian models. According to Belavia management, upon completion of all necessary testing and full-scale serial production, the airline will be ready to promptly consider and execute Russian aircraft procurement as an important fleet development direction for the near term.

Strategic fleet modernization through deeper cooperation with Asian, African, or Arab lessors—where service capacity and supply channel access remains—is also possible. However, such decisions require comprehensive expertise and guaranteed component and maintenance access throughout the aircraft’s operational life.

In the geopolitical context, sanctions “residual effects” continue influencing Belavia’s routes and partner infrastructure. The carrier’s development prospects are assessed as dependent on political decisions, long-term legal framework stability, and foreign economic relations. As Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko noted, Belavia and the entire aviation industry are ready to consider large-scale joint projects provided rules are equal and fair. The prospect of a major deal with American partners remains relevant, but the key condition for reaching a new cooperation level is balancing both parties’ interests with transparency and fairness in all agreements.

In the current situation, Belarus intends not only to respond to external proposals but to formulate its own demands, defending national interests. This balanced approach, according to the head of state, should form the basis for restoring constructive economic ties where both parties seek mutually beneficial solutions.