RuAviation

In the early spring of 2024 Army Recognition (Brussels) reported that during the period from 24 February 2022 to early March of this year – was documented more than 4400 uses of attack UAV ‘Geranium’, which is an average of more than 240 per month. Moreover, it was only in the first half of September-2022 that photos of the wreckage of the previously unknown Russian Geran-2 UAV appeared on the Web. It was reportedly a kamikaze drone that had attacked Ukrainian positions in the western part of Kupyansk.

If we follow the reports of both Russian and Ukrainian TG channels on the topic of the use of Geran-2 kamikaze drones for September and the first days of October 2024, we find that such publications were daily. Ukrainian sources write that Russian Geran kamikaze drones have become much more effective than before. They cite several reasons for this and note the record number of Geranium launches in September.

‘The rate of launches is not dropping, but on the contrary, is on the rise, while the air defence is experiencing a shortage of anti-aircraft missiles. There is also a growing shortage of ammunition for conventional anti-aircraft artillery guns and German Cheetahs. At the same time, the effectiveness of mobile groups is falling,’ Ukrainian TG-channel Legitimate reported.

‘The Ukrainian Air Force has almost stopped using aircraft in the fight against the Gepards, as there have been several cases when Ukrainian Su-27s and MiG-29s were lured to kamikaze UAVs, or perhaps they were decoy targets, and then Russian pilots on Su-35S shot down the fighters with trident on their keels with air-to-air missiles or they became a target for Russian air defence assets.’

‘Now the trend is not in Ukraine’s favour. This means that the damage from the raids of Geraniums will be constantly increasing, which will 100 per cent affect the combat effectiveness of the AFU,’ the authors of the TG-channel believe.

Ukrainian observers also do not believe Forbes Ukraine, which in one of its publications on Russia’s military-industrial capabilities reported that the Russian military-industrial complex manufactures 42 to 56 ballistic missiles and up to 115 long-range cruise missiles per month, as well as more than 500 Geranium UAVs, calling such reports ‘another fabrication.’ The same Legitimate reports that according to its data ‘the figure is at least twice as much, and according to the Geran/Shahed UAV production case, the Russians are producing at least three times as many.’

‘Right now on UAVs, the Russians are in the process of accumulation and stockpiling for ‘just in case’. That’s why not all UAVs produced are launched immediately in Ukraine. Here it is worth to understand why the old thesis that the Russians are about to run out of something is being launched once again’. The authors of TG-channel ask, do they want to raise the morale of society and the army with such a primitive trick? To instil hope that it is worth to be a little more patient and the missiles with UAVs will end? The answer to which lies on the surface.

Speaking at a meeting of the Military-Industrial Commission on the development of special-purpose unmanned aircraft systems on 19 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that about 140,000 drones of various types had been delivered to the Armed Forces in 2023. In 2024, it is planned to deliver almost ten times more drones to the troops. The public in Ukraine does not know this.

In addition, the development and modernisation of long-range kamikaze drones ‘Geranium’ is underway. During a visit to the Special Technology Centre in St. Petersburg, the Russian President was presented with a promising modification of the Geran UAV with the index MS-236, equipped with a modular optoelectronic multispectral scanner (MOMS) based on a television and thermal imaging sensor with a command and telemetry communication channel via 4G/LTE cellular network or, in the future, via satellite radio correction channels. Evgeny Damantsev, analyst of the Russian Weapons TG-channel, notes that the selection and identification of priority targets of the MOMS allows for artificial intelligence based on TV/IR signals loaded into the drone’s internal memory.

‘These UAVs with low EOP will also be able to perform optoelectronic reconnaissance in target sectors to provide targeting guidance to outfits of other Geran-2 kamikaze UAVs, Kh-69 CRs, 9M723-1 Iskander-M operational-tactical missiles and other precision-guided weapons,’ arms expert says.

The Kiev-based extremely nationalistic and Russophobic publication Defence Express (the site is blocked for Russian users), having found the American satellite system Starlink on one of the fallen Geraniums, sarcastically expressed gratitude to the billionaire and owner of the social network banned in Russia: ‘Thanks to Ilon Musk: the Russians first installed Starlink on a Shahed-136, creating a new dangerous weapon’. And forced to admit that Starlink turns the Geranium-2 into a long-range reconnaissance and strike barrage munition.

‘During tonight’s night attack (25.09.2024), the AFU detected a Russian Geran UAV (Shahed-136) equipped with SpaceX’s Starlink satellite communications system. This is a means of receiving feedback from the drone and the ability to transfer information from it and change the flight mission at any distance. That is, turning Shahed into a reconnaissance vehicle. Such communication may be necessary for the Russian army to transmit information, for example, collected by radio-technical means about AFU air defence positions. Or, in case the drone is equipped with cameras – images. In this case, in a mode that is unlikely to be recorded,’ Defence Express writes.

And adds that ‘thanks to Starlink and the installed camera, the Russian Federation can use Shahed as an extremely long-range barrage munition with the ability to reconnaissance and hit even moving targets.’

Russian sources note the use of Geran-2 drones to overload the Kiev regime’s air defence systems and open up the radar positions of Western surface-to-air missile systems. ‘Apparently, the central (Kiev) and northern (Chernihiv) air defence nodes in Ukraine are being overloaded with Geran drones for the second day. ‘It is quite possible that additional strikes will soon follow,’ the Military Chronicle TG-channel said in a 3 October report.

On the same day, the Russian Weapons TG channel reported on the work of Geran-2 kamikaze drones over the Kiev region and linked it not to a local strike on any military targets, but to the detection of IRIS-T SLM radar positions and Skynex anti-aircraft artillery systems covering strategically important enemy facilities.

One of the centres of the Russian drone industry is located in Tatarstan. Ukraine’s armed formations have been paying close attention to the Alabuga Free Economic Zone, where the production of Geran-2 kamikaze UAVs is believed to be deployed, and have not abandoned attempts to attack the plant with their long-range drones: in 2024, there have been repeated reports of the temporary closure of Kazan and Begishevo airports.

Analysts at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) consider the Geran-2 to be Russia’s weapon of victory. It was thanks to these and other types of kamikaze drones that the Russian army achieved air superiority during the liberation of Maryinka and Avdeevka. ISIS experts estimate that due to a steady increase in production, some 6,000 attack drones will already be produced by September 2025.

But on 28 September, Defence Express reported in its TG channel that the Alabuga FEZ had produced the 6,000th Geranium UAV a year ahead of initial plans. And on the frontline, Russian troops are already using new types of kamikaze drones with jet engines.

In the West (Army Recognition), Geranium UAVs are considered the most common type of strike weapon than any other Russian long-range weapon. Their relatively low cost and ease of production compared to cruise and ballistic missiles have made this kamikaze drone the cornerstone of Russia’s air campaign, which has successfully depleted Ukrainian air defences and caused irreparable damage to fuel and lubricant depots and Western weapons at transshipment points in the ports of Izmail, Odessa and Ilyichevsk.