President Donald Trump warned Beijing on October 10, 2025, that the United States might impose export controls on Boeing aircraft components used in China in retaliation for Beijing’s rare-earth mineral restrictions. He told reporters at the White House, “We have plenty of tools at our disposal. One of the most serious is aviation. They have many Boeing jets, and they need parts and everything that goes with them,” according to Reuters.
Bloomberg reported in August that Boeing is negotiating the sale of 500 aircraft to China—its first major Chinese order under the Trump administration. Scott Hamilton of Leeham Co. believes that even if the deal falls through, Boeing’s financial exposure would likely remain limited.
Historically, China accounted for up to 25 percent of Boeing’s orders; today that share is below 5 percent. Cirium data show Chinese carriers have placed firm orders for at least 222 Boeing aircraft and currently operate 1,855 jets. Most are single-aisle 737s. Any embargo on parts would also hit CFM International (a GE Aerospace–Safran JV producing the LEAP engine for the 737 MAX) as well as GE engines for the 777 and 787—models ordered by Chinese airlines.
The very prospect of restricting Boeing parts to China has rippled across the global aviation market. Chinese carriers, tier-1 suppliers and investors are already reassessing their plans and building in delivery-risk premiums. Experts warn this could create a crisis for Boeing and its U.S. partners, while accelerating Chinese airlines’ search for alternative airframes and components outside the United States, including from European manufacturers.
In mid-April 2025, Chinese authorities instructed carriers to suspend acceptance of certain Boeing aircraft and related spares in response to new U.S. tariffs. By May and June, after securing trade concessions, Beijing eased those restrictions and allowed deliveries to resume.
Economically, Boeing stands to lose significantly. About 130 aircraft in its backlog are designated for Chinese customers—roughly 10 percent of its confirmed orders. Disruptions could thus inflict substantial financial damage.
China’s COMAC C919 project is often presented as a long-term solution to Western dependency, yet it still relies heavily on U.S. and EU suppliers. In January 2025, COMAC aimed to produce 30 aircraft and ramp up to 50 per year; by September, sources said that plan was cut to around 25 due to engine and avionics shortages. Only five C919s were delivered in H1 2025, underscoring serious production challenges.
Legally, refusal to accept aircraft carries the risk of disputes. Contracts typically include advance payments and penalties. If buyers cancel without cause, Boeing may retain deposits; but if U.S. export policy blocks deliveries, Chinese firms could demand refunds or credit toward future orders, potentially leading to multi-billion-dollar claims.
At this point, Trump’s comments should be seen as diplomatic leverage rather than an immediate sanction. Still, the threat alone has forced investors to reprice Boeing shares for delivery risk and prompted analysts to cut near-term profit forecasts. The consequences for Washington extend beyond Boeing’s bottom line.
Boeing drives U.S. exports: each export dollar generates up to three dollars of value in related industries (Aerospace Industries Association). Losing tens of billions in Chinese orders could trigger a ripple effect from avionics suppliers to machine-tool employment. A trade split would weaken U.S. standing in the world’s largest civil-aviation market—China is projected to account for about 20 percent of global demand for new aircraft from 2025 to 2035. If Airbus and COMAC capture that share, the U.S. risks not only lost profits but also diminished long-term technological and political influence. Even absent a formal ban, Boeing’s reputation as a symbol of American engineering leadership is under strain, prompting global carriers to diversify and reduce reliance on U.S. suppliers.
In summary, U.S. policy toward China already inflicts strategic costs by undermining industrial resilience and eroding Boeing’s competitive position versus Airbus and COMAC. Should export controls be implemented, Washington might win short-term political points but suffer greater economic and technological losses in the long term.

